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Growing nervousness in
the bond market may be signaling an end to the free lunch Americans have
enjoyed for the last three years, where foreigners have essentially financed
our budget deficit. This has kept interest rates low, fueling a boom in the
housing market, and allowed politicians to believe that there are no
economic consequences to massive budget deficits. But should foreigners even
slow down their purchases of Treasury bonds, this bubble could burst very
suddenly, leading to sharply higher interest rates almost overnight.
Historically, our national debt has been financed almost entirely
domestically. In the 1960s, foreign ownership of the debt was less than five
percent. This crept up to about 20 percent in the late 1970s, as oil
exporters invested much of their cash flow in Treasury securities. But the
percentage of foreign ownership fell in the 1980s despite the growth of
budget deficits. By 1984, foreign ownership was down to 13 percent.
During the Clinton Administration, the amount of the national debt owned
by foreigners roughly doubled, from 18 percent in 1992 to 35 percent by
1999. This figure drifted downward as budget surpluses emerged, but has shot
upward since 2002. As of the end of 2004, foreign ownership of the debt
reached almost $2 trillion, 44 percent of the total held by the public.
When concerns are raised about this situation, the Treasury points to the
fact that most of the foreign-owned debt is not among fickle private
lenders, who may dump their holdings at the first sign of trouble. Rather,
most of the increase in foreign ownership has been by foreign central banks,
which are presumed to be long-term holders. At the end of 2004, foreign
central banks owned $1.2 trillion of the $1.9 trillion of Treasury bonds,
bills and notes owned by foreigners, 60 percent of the total.
Of course, foreign central banks are not buying Treasury securities as a
favor to us. They do so partly because Treasuries are the safest place to
put their money, since the risk of default is nonexistent. But the main
reason is that buying and selling Treasuries is the way they control the
value of their currencies vis-à-vis the dollar.
Because the dollar is the dominant world currency, the one in which the
bulk of world trade takes place, including all transactions in the oil
market, the U.S. has the luxury of ignoring the international value of the
dollar. It goes up or down on the free market, largely free of intervention
by the Treasury Department.
But other countries cannot do this. The value of their currency is a
vital element of their economic policy, having an enormous impact on trade
and capital flows and the standard of living. Those that get it wrong, such
as Argentina, suffer very badly and may go through years of economic
stagnation as a consequence.
When a nation wants to keep its currency stable against the dollar, it
must sell dollars from its portfolio against its own currency when market
pressure is causing their currency to fall. This reduces the supply of their
currency relative to dollars and causes their currency to rise. When their
currency is rising against the dollar, they do the reverse, selling their
own currency and buying dollars.
In recent years, there has been strong upward pressure on China’s and
Japan’s currencies. This has forced their central banks to buy a lot of
dollars, which they hold in dollar-denominated assets. Treasury securities
are the most convenient of such assets. Hence, their large holdings of
Treasuries is mainly a consequence of their exchange rate policy.
The Chinese and Japanese exchange rate policy is basically to facilitate
trade. If their currencies rose against the dollar then their goods would
become more expensive to us in terms of dollars and our goods would become
cheaper to them in terms of their currency. Without active intervention in
the foreign exchange market, therefore, the market would automatically help
redress the U.S. trade deficit. But as long as the yen and yuan are
prevented from rising, this mechanism does not operate.
Many in the U.S. view this as a form of protectionism that in effect
subsidizes Chinese and Japanese exports to us while penalizing our exports
to them. This may be true, but the necessary consequence of doing so is that
China and Japan must finance their own exports by lending us the money to
buy their goods.
Although China has said it will continue buying dollars and investing in
Treasury securities, other countries have decided that they have enough
dollars and will start curtailing their purchases. Russia and Korea have
announced plans to reduce their dollar holdings and Japan is saying that it
will diversify its foreign exchange portfolio in the future. The end of the
free lunch may now be in sight. |