The United States' sugar
policy has a long history of supporting sugar producers, and the current system
has its roots in the agricultural programs of the Great Depression. The policy
has been widely criticized both at home and abroad for supporting a relatively
small group of sugar producers at the expense of consumers, taxpayers,
sugar-using industries, and the environment. The program relies on restricting
sugar imports to keep domestic prices high, which especially hurts those
developing countries that are low-cost producers of sugar. The artificially high
price also provides incentives for domestic sugar producers to increase
production into environmentally sensitive areas.
This paper explores the possibility of reform of the sugar program by
considering other agricultural reforms at home and abroad. The cases examined
are New Zealand's agricultural policy reform in the mid-1980s, changes to the
United States peanut quota program through a buyout program, and the buyout
program for tobacco quota holders in the United States.
The pressures for reform come from several sources. The desire to complete
further regional and bilateral free trade agreements might require more sugar
market opening “concessions” by the United States, especially if negotiations
with low-cost sugar producers are to be completed. In addition, the timetable of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will allow more Mexican sugar
imports in the near future.
The ongoing negotiations among the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
to conclude the Doha Development Round revolve around agricultural policies. The
United States and other industrial countries might have to provide better market
access for developing countries to complete the Doha Round.
The debate over the upcoming 2007 farm bill will highlight the need for reform
of several costly agricultural programs, and while the sugar program has escaped
significant changes over the last few decades, this is not guaranteed in the
future.
The examination of three reform experiences in other areas provides some insight
into possible options for sugar reform:
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Agricultural reforms in
New Zealand, which opted for a “shock reform” that left farmers little time to
adjust to the new policies.
While difficult for many
farmers, the reforms did not lead to the collapse of the agricultural sector,
as some had feared. In contrast, agricultural production has thrived over the
past two decades.
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The buyout program for
peanut quota holders enacted after the 2002 Farm Act.
The changes abolished a
two-tiered price system under which quota holders were guaranteed a minimum
price of $610 per ton, while other producers received a minimum $132 and were
restricted from selling in the domestic market.
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The compensation of
tobacco quota holders through a buyout program.
This was enacted after
tobacco reform abolished the existing tobacco quota and price support program.
These cases represent examples
of the possible reform scenarios for sugar: the quick dismantling of the
existing sugar program or a buyout option.
The conclusion that might be
drawn is that, to be successful, reform needs to address several concerns, such
as reducing the high costs for consumers and the sugar-using industries, as well
as providing a long-term policy framework for sugar growers.
Reform efforts have been unsuccessful for decades because sugar producers could
consistently muster enough political support for their political allies to block
significant domestic changes. However, pressure for reform has not only arisen
from criticism inside the United States but also from outside—for example,
progress in liberalizing trade in other areas puts pressure on agriculture to
follow suit; bilateral trade agreements with neighboring countires open up the
U.S. markets, therefore increasing demand to provide poorer countries with
better chances to participate in the world economy.
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